


Global
Challenges
Foundation

Remodelling global cooperation

Global Challenges Quarterly Risk Report



GLOBAL CHALLENGES QUARTERLY RISK REPORT – REMODELLING GLOBAL COOPERATION

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors. Their statements are not necessarily endorsed by the affiliated organisations or the Global Challenges Foundation.

Team

Project leader: Carin Ism
Editor-in-chief: Julien Leyre
Art director: Elinor Hägg
Project assistant: Elizabeth Ng

Contributors

Anne Marie Goetz

Professor, Center for Global Affairs, School of Professional Studies, New York University, USA

Atangcho Nji Akonumbo

Associate Professor of Law, University of Yaoundé II/University of Bamenda, Cameroon

Benjamin Barber

Distinguished senior fellow, Fordham School of Law Urban Consortium, USA

David Held

Professor of Politics and International Relations, Durham University, UK

Folke Tersman

Chair Professor of Practical Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden

Gidon Bromberg

Co-director, EcoPeace Middle East, Israel

Ian Manners

Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

James Fennell Tempelhof

Operations Manager, BITNATION

Johan Rockström

Executive director, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Sweden

Magnus Jiborn

Researcher, Lund School of Economics, Sweden

Malini Mehra

Chief Executive, GLOBE International, UK

Maria Ivanova

Associate Professor of Global Governance and Director, Center for Governance and Sustainability, University of Massachusetts Boston, USA

Nader Khateeb

Co-director, EcoPeace Middle East, Palestine

Sir Martin Rees

Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, Cambridge University, UK

Munqeth Mehyar

Co-director, EcoPeace Middle East, Jordan

Pang Zhongying

Professor, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, School of International Studies, Renmin University, China

Robert Muggah

Research director, Igarapé Institute, Brazil

Sachin Joshi

Director, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII-ITC) Centre of Excellence for Sustainable Development, India

Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof

Founder/CEO, BITNATION

THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOUNDATION works to incite deeper understanding of the global risks that threaten humanity and catalyse ideas to tackle them. Rooted in a scientific analysis of risk, the Foundation brings together the brightest minds from academia, politics, business and civil society to forge transformative approaches to secure a better future for all.

Contents


Foreword	4
Preface	5
Executive Summary	6
Part 1. Making sense of the present	9
1.1 A long-term perspective on global catastrophic risk – <i>Sir Martin Rees</i>	10
1.2 From multilateralism to gridlock and beyond – <i>David Held</i>	12
1.3 The current shape of global governance – a look inside the UN structure – <i>Magnus Jiborn/Folke Tersman</i>	15
1.4 Global environmental goals: What works, what doesn't and why? – <i>Maria Ivanova</i>	20
Part 2. Emerging Trends	22
2.1 Governance for sustainable development – courts as the new game-changers – <i>Malini Mehra</i>	23
2.2 Privatization of global governance – <i>Sachin Joshi</i>	25
2.3 Gender equality in global governance: not an optional extra – <i>Anne Marie Goetz</i>	27
2.4 China's role in global governance – <i>Pang Zhongying</i>	29
2.5 Perspectives on the African single passport – <i>Atangcho Nji Akonumbo</i>	31
2.6 From the regional to the global: better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart – <i>Ian Manners</i>	34
2.7 The 'Big Jump into the Jordan' – putting water before conflict – <i>Gidon Bromberg/Nader Khateeb/Munqeth Mehyar</i>	36
2.8 Cities are key to our survival in the twenty first century – <i>Robert Muggah/Benjamin Barber</i>	38
2.9 BITNATION Pangea: the world's first virtual nation – a blockchain jurisdiction – <i>Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof/ James Fennell Tempelhof</i>	41
Part 3. Looking to the future	43
3.1 Planetary stewardship in the Anthropocene – <i>Johan Rockström</i>	44
Continuing the conversation	46
Endnotes	49

Foreword

In the aftermath of the US elections, there can be no more relevant time to examine whether our current systems of global cooperation are fit for purpose. That is, are they designed to effectively tackle the most pressing threats to humanity: catastrophic climate change, other environmental ruin, various weapons of mass destruction and global pandemics?

The current political drumbeat against globalization and in favour of nationalism is deeply dangerous at a time when we face global risks that are unprecedented in their scale and complexity. These threats transcend national borders and can affect anyone anywhere on the planet. In an interconnected and interdependent world the international community has outrun its ability to deal with them.

Einstein pointed out, “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” It follows there is no logical reason why a system of international bodies and agreements that has evolved over the 70 years since the Second World War should be suitable for governing the crises we face today.



When I founded the Global Challenges Foundation in 2012, I did so because I wanted to deepen insights into the urgent global risks we face. I also wanted to help to spark a conversation about how these threats could be better handled. That is the intention of this report. We have gathered

perspectives from around the world and across disciplines in an attempt to catalyse discussion around potential new pathways.

Of this I am certain: bold thinking and urgent action are needed in order to address the interlinked and mutually reinforcing mega risks we face. These risks cannot be solved at the national level: the time has come to re-envision, to re-model our system of global governance. Our planet – and the very future of human life on it – depends upon it.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'L. Szombatfalvy'. The signature is fluid and cursive.

Laszlo Szombatfalvy
Founder of Global Challenges Foundation

Preface

In the 20th Century, human beings solved some of the toughest challenges of our history. We eradicated smallpox. We dramatically decreased the numbers of children dying before their fifth birthdays. We stabilized the hole in the ozone layer.



divisions to present a range of viewpoints, from men and women spanning the fields of political thought, astronomy, international law, technology and environmentalism. It includes perspectives from Africa, China and South America as well as Europe and the United States.

Human inventiveness has triggered an explosion of technological and scientific advances that have improved living standards for billions. But these advances have also created the greatest risks we face today including climate change and weapons of mass destruction.

At the Global Challenges Foundation, we believe that human ingenuity can, if properly channelled, play a role in averting humanity's greatest challenges. If we can tap this creativity and apply it to the task of re-designing how the world community organizes and takes decisions, then we will have a greater chance of avoiding the worst risks we face.

That is why we need an intensive global conversation about global governance that straddles disciplines, sectors and regions. Too often, experts work in their silos. This report attempts to break down these

This report is not a blueprint for how to organize the world; rather it is a thought prompt, a set of key questions with some ideas advanced for how they might be approached. It is presented with the hope of stimulating conversation on this most urgent topic. For it is only by holding truly global conversations that we can shape the global solutions needed.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mats Andersson', written over a thin vertical line.

Mats Andersson
Vice-chairman,
Global Challenges Foundation
Former CEO, Fourth Swedish
National Pension Fund, co-founder
Portfolio Decarbonization Coalition

Executive summary

Julien Leyre, Global Challenges Foundation, Melbourne, Australia.

This report brings together a set of diverse perspectives on global governance from independent thinkers. It does not attempt to lay out a prescriptive path as to how global decision-making should be organised, but rather, it aims to stimulate reflection and invite the reader to explore new directions.

Four initial pieces set the scene, situating the main challenges that the world now faces in a broader historical perspective. We open with a contribution from Cambridge astrophysicist Sir Martin Rees who takes what might be called ‘the long view’. In ‘A long-term perspective on global catastrophic risk’, he considers the 45 million century life span of the Earth, identifying our present century as unique. It is the first era when our species is in a position to determine the planet’s future, choosing between ‘ever more wonderful complexity’ and higher forms of intelligence, or a darker view where human folly could foreclose this immense future potential. The biggest challenge, he concludes, is not scientific or technological, it is political: persuading decision-makers to carefully consider the long-term consequences of their actions.

The second contributor, David Held from Durham University, examines the state of gridlock into which our international institutions have fallen in ‘From multilateralism to gridlock and beyond’. Developed after the traumas of the Second World War, current institutions have enabled the globalised world that we know today, but they are increasingly unable to tackle the greatest problems of our time. David Held attributes this to rising multi-polarity, institutional inertia, tougher problems and institutional fragmentation. Humanity now faces a crossroads, and could head either towards authoritarianism, or a ‘brighter cosmopolitanism’. This second and more hopeful perspective would entail embracing a new form of citizenship that goes beyond national allegiances to more flexible and interconnected kinds of political belonging, anchored in the principle that all human beings are of equal moral worth.

In the next piece, ‘The current shape of global governance – a look inside the UN structure’, philosophers Magnus Jiborg from Lund University and Folke Tersman from Uppsala University provide a general

overview of the United Nations – the current focal point of global governance, designed for the voluntary coordination of sovereign nations. The piece offers an optimistic perspective on our existing systems by considering the various areas where the UN has had at least partial success in coordinating action towards environmental protection, poverty reduction or conflict prevention. Perhaps, the authors suggest, an institution designed to address one set of problems might evolve, and prove capable of tackling others.

The last piece in this first section takes a different angle and considers how little we know about the actual effect of our global collaboration efforts. A number of international treaties exist to support environmental protection, but until recently, no system was in place to systematically monitor their impact, or even whether commitments are fully implemented. In ‘Global Environmental Goals: What works, what doesn’t and why?’ Maria Ivanova from the University of Massachusetts Boston introduces a new research project that monitors the implementation of treaties on environmental issues. The ultimate goal of the project is to increase accountability and to support better institutional design. Early results encourage optimism: developing countries show better performance than expected and data reporting is consistent. An environmental conventions implementation index, which is developed as part of this project, will provide a valuable accountability tool for future treaties and agreements.

The second part of the report offers a selection of nine pieces from independent thinkers that each consider the question of global governance from a particular perspective, encouraging reflection on the multiple dimensions of this complex issue.

The changing role of the courts in protecting global public goods is a theme that has been highlighted by recent legal cases, firstly against ExxonMobil’s failure to disclose environmental risks to their shareholders, and secondly against the Islamic terrorist Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi for destroying UNESCO World Heritage Monuments in Timbuktu, Mali. In ‘Governance for sustainable development – courts as the new game changers,’ Malini Mehra from Globe International argues that when companies and governments are becoming less trusted with ensuring the preservation

of our environment, the judiciary may offer a solution and a source of hope.

Recent years have seen a marked shift in the role played by the private sector in global governance. Sachin Joshi from the Confederation of Indian Industry explores these changes in 'The privatisation of global governance'. Increasingly perceived as a potential source of solutions for global challenges, the private sector now has a seat at the negotiating table along governments and civil society. In a world where new technologies crucial to the future of humanity – such as human genome mapping or artificial intelligence – are largely controlled by private sector entities, there is a strong case for their involvement in global decision-making. This may signal the beginning of a new era where global governance is increasingly privatised.

'Women's leadership in global governance' – or the lack of it – is a subject tackled by New York University's Anne Marie Goetz in a passionate indictment of the lack of women in our current global governance structures. Gender parity within institutions is just one aspect of the problem however, argues the author: institutions must actively embrace a feminist agenda. Improvements to the condition of women must be listed as a global priority, and accountability systems must be put in place to ensure that the fight against misogyny progresses everywhere in the world if multilateral solutions are to be found.

China's rise in the late 20th and early 21st centuries resulted in a massive shift in geopolitical balance. In 'China's role in global governance,' Professor Pang Zhongying from Renmin University examines how China continues to deepen its relations with existing global governance institutions, while using different strategies to push a reformist agenda, and aspiring to a central position in global forums, a bridge between East and West, between developed and developing countries. In a time of 'global governance deficit,' the author argues, China may act as a factor of stability – but China's long march towards an established role in global governance has not yet come to an end.

Against the background of nationalist agendas challenging regional integration, the recent adoption of a single African passport could offer grounds for optimism. In 'Perspectives on the African single passport,' Cameroonian legal expert Atangcho Nji Akonumbo explores the impact this initiative could have for Africa. A continent-wide market could stimulate intra-African trade and investment, encourage entrepreneurship and business diversification, he argues. However, the institution of a single passport alone

will not be sufficient: development efforts – from education to infrastructure, peace and stability – are all crucial to unity and long term prosperity on the continent.

In 'From the regional to the global: better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart', professor Ian Manners from the University of Copenhagen interrogates the European experience, and what might be learned from its successes. Over its seventy years of existence, the European Union has achieved peace, prosperity and social progress in a continent that, for centuries, had hardly experienced ten years without a war. These achievements, argues Ian Manners, are deeply connected to the core principle of the European Union Treaty – subsidiarity or 'to better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart'.

In the Middle East, unusual forms of cooperation hold valuable lessons for collaboration at the global level. 'The big jump into the Jordan – putting water before conflict' by the three co-directors of EcoPeace Middle East, in Jordan, Israel and Palestine, tells of one such initiative. EcoPeace is a recent initiative that brings together municipalities bordering the Jordan River. Over the years, the Jordan River, which serves as a border between regions in conflict, has become little more than a sewer, with severe environmental consequences. How could a river holy to half of humanity suffer such a demise? To address this issue, EcoPeace has developed a systematic local awareness raising campaign and engaged local leaders in symbolic acts – inviting Mayors to jump into the Jordan together. These initiatives are building ground for collaboration, and slowly, the river is showing signs of a rebirth.

Cities offer vibrant alternative approaches to cooperation when it comes to addressing global challenges, particularly environmental issues and climate change. In 'Cities are key to our survival in the twenty first century,' Robert Muggah of Brazil's Igarapé Institute and Benjamin Barber of New York's Fordham School of Law show how the city may be one of the most crucial form of political organisations in the coming century. While nation states are building walls around themselves, cities are building bridges between each other. Further progress will require structures that allow for deeper engagement, particularly between cities in wealthier nations and the fast-growing metropolises of the Global South – and some of these are already taking shape.

The final piece in this section offers an original perspective on the potential impact new technologies

might have on global governance, and how radical alternatives to current models might emerge. In 'BIT-NATION Pangea: the world's first virtual nation – a blockchain jurisdiction,' Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof paints a picture of how blockchain technology could herald a new form of governance. Through secure technological systems, individuals could join an alternative polity based on electronically negotiated contracts, thus bypassing the traditional nation state model.

We live in exceptional times: our present period, that of the Anthropocene, or era of human impact on the biosphere, presents unique challenges and the real possibility of catastrophic destruction. Yet, argues

Johan Rockström from the Stockholm Resilience Centre in 'Planetary stewardship in the Anthropocene', leverage points for transformative change exist. Looking to the future, these four in particular deserve our attention: new legal norms that consider the notion of planetary boundaries; changes to the mandate of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) that would upgrade the organisation to coordinate international rules in ways that support a transition to global sustainability; a strong commitment to develop and support innovations that have a positive impact on the biosphere; and consistent efforts to secure popular endorsement, so that proposed changes are not only effective but also perceived as legitimate.

Part 1.

Making sense of the present

1.1. A long-term perspective on global catastrophic risk

Sir Martin Rees, Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, Cambridge University, UK

Are we wise enough to make decisions that will avoid the pitfall of short-termism? Even from a very long perspective, this century is special: for the first time, one species – ours – is in a position to determine the future of our entire planet. If humanity is to reach yet higher levels of development and complexity, the biggest challenges that we face are not scientific or technological, but political.

Astronomers like myself have a long perspective. We know that our Earth is 45 million centuries old, and it's got 60 million more before the Sun dies. We humans surely aren't the culmination of evolution – we may not even be the half-way stage in the emergence of ever more wonderful complexity. But even on this compressed time chart, stretching billions of years into the future as well as into the past, this century is special. It's the first when one species, ours, is so empowered and dominant that it can determine the planet's future. It's the century when we could jump-start the transition to post-human and electronic intelligence, and spread beyond the Earth. Or – to take a darker view – the century where our follies could foreclose this immense future potential.

The stakes are high. And the threats are real. It's a wise maxim that 'the unfamiliar isn't the same as the improbable' There are concerns that we may not properly cope with the runaway advance in novel technologies – biotechnology, cybertechnology and Artificial Intelligence.

These technologies should be our friends. Without applying new science, the world can't provide food and sustainable clean energy for an expanding and more demanding population. They offer inspirational

challenges for young scientists and engineers.

But these same technologies have downsides – they lead to new vulnerabilities.

Our world increasingly depends on elaborate networks: electric-power grids, GPS, international finance, globally-dispersed manufacturing, and so forth. Unless these networks are highly resilient, their benefits could be outweighed by catastrophic (albeit rare) breakdowns that cascade globally – real-world analogues of the 2008 financial crash. Cities would be paralyzed without electricity, and supermarket shelves empty within days if supply chains were disrupted.

Air travel can spread a pandemic worldwide within days. And social media can spread panic, rumour and economic contagion, literally at the speed of light.

Advances in microbiology – diagnostics, vaccines and antibiotics – offer huge potential. But the same research has controversial aspects. 'Gain of function' experiments can make viruses both more virulent and transmissible. The new CRISPR gene-editing technique is hugely promising, but concerns are raised about unintended consequences of 'gene drive' programs to wipe out parasitic species. In addition, biotechnology now involves small-scale, dual use equipment. Indeed, biohacking is even burgeoning as

a hobby and competitive game. It is very possible that whatever regulations are imposed on prudential or ethical grounds can't be enforced worldwide any more than the drug laws or the tax laws can.

And there's another set of global threats that stem from humanity's ever-heavier collective 'footprint' on the planet – depleted resources, impoverished ecologies and changed climate. How much should we care about these trends? We're clearly harmed if fish stocks dwindle to extinction. There are plants in the rain forest whose genes may be useful to us. But this is too anthropocentric a focus – biodiversity surely has intrinsic value over and above its benefit to us humans. To quote the great ecologist E O Wilson, if our despoliation of nature causes mass extinctions "it's the action that future generations will least forgive us for".

There seems to be no scientific impediment to achieving a sustainable and secure world, where all enjoy a lifestyle better than those in the 'West' do today. We can be technological optimists. But the intractable politics and sociology – the gap between potentialities and what actually happens – engenders pessimism. Politicians look to their own voters and the next election. We downplay what's happening even now in far-away countries. And we discount too heavily the problems we'll leave for new generations.

This short-termism is saddening – and immoral, when we ourselves cherish and depend on the heritage left by past generations.

Those who built Europe's great cathedrals thought the world might only last another thousand years – they knew of nothing beyond Europe. But despite these constricted horizons in both space and time, they devoted their energy to works that would not be completed in their lifetime – and that still uplift our spirits centuries later.

Unlike our forebears we know we're stewards of a 'pale blue dot' in a vast cosmos whose fate depends on humanity's collective actions this century. So it's shameful that our horizon is shorter than theirs. Spaceship Earth is hurtling through the void. Its passengers are anxious and fractious. Their life-support system is vulnerable to disruption and breakdowns. There's too little horizon-scanning to minimize long-term risks.

Activists and experts by themselves can't generate or sustain political will. Their voice must be amplified by a wide public and by the media – otherwise long-term global causes can't compete on the political agenda with the immediate and the local.

Without a broader perspective – without realizing that we're all on this crowded world together – governments won't properly prioritize projects that political perspectives consider long-term.

SIR MARTIN REES

Sir Martin Rees is a Fellow of Trinity College and Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics at the University of Cambridge. In 2005 he was appointed to the House of Lords, and was formerly President of the Royal Society. While in these roles, he engaged with both policymakers and the public to better prepare for our long term challenges. He is the author of a number of popular books, including *Just Six Numbers* and the existential risk-focused *Our Final Century?* He has written over 500 peer reviewed papers and eight books in total.

1.2. From multilateralism to gridlock and beyond

David Held, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Durham University, UK

How might we go beyond the gridlock of today's international governance systems? Institutions developed after the Second World War have become the victims of their own success, and are no longer able to face the systemic challenges of our globalised environment. We are at a crossroads: one path leads towards authoritarianism, but another opens up a more hopeful cosmopolitan future, where citizenship is a non-exclusive form of belonging, and each human being is considered of equal moral worth.

World War II, the Holocaust, and the rise of Nazism and fascism brought humanity to the brink. As the violence subsided, the toll of this human drama weighed heavily on world leaders, and recommitted leading powers to set down a structure of global order capable of preventing a war of this magnitude from ever occurring again.

The post-war multilateral organizations created in the wake of this destruction – the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions – established conditions under which, in principle, a multitude of actors could benefit from forming corporations, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes that ushered in a new era of globalization. This is not to say that these institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. Nonetheless, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great

Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as digital communication, satellite technology, and email.

However, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war rule-based order are now amongst the factors grinding the global system into gridlock, and affecting our ability to engage in further global cooperation. As a result of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the post-war order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945, and the need for international cooperation is marked. Yet the “supply” side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, is stalling. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is extremely urgent. Why?

There are four reasons for this blockage, or four pathways to gridlock: rising multi-polarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. As I argue with my colleagues Thomas Hale and Kevin Young in our book *Gridlock* (2013), each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. First, reaching agreement in complex international negotiations is hampered by the rise of new powers like India, China and Brazil: a more diverse array of interests have to be hammered into agreement for any global deal to be made. On the one hand, multi-polarity is a positive sign of development; on the other hand, it can easily bring both more voices and interests to the table, so that it becomes harder to weave them into coherent outcomes. Second, the institutions created seventy years ago have proven difficult to change, as established interests cling to outmoded decision-making rules that fail to reflect current conditions. Third, the problems we are facing on a global scale have grown more complex, penetrating deep into domestic policies, and are often extremely difficult to resolve. Fourth, in many areas, international institutions have proliferated with overlapping and contradictory mandates, creating a confusing fragmentation of authority.

These trends combine in many sectors to make successful cooperation at the global level extremely difficult to achieve. The risks that follow from this are all too obvious. To manage the global economy, prevent runaway environmental destruction, rein in nuclear proliferation, or confront other global challenges, we must cooperate. But many of our tools for global policy-making – chiefly, state-to-state negotiations over treaties and international institutions – are breaking down or inadequate, at a time when our fate and fortunes are acutely interwoven. Signs of this today are everywhere: climate change is still threatening all life as we know it, conflicts such as Syria continue to run out of control, small arms sales proliferate despite all efforts to contain them, migration has increased rapidly and is destabilising many societies, and inequality threatens the fabric of social life across the world. While it is far from gloom and doom in all respects, these are dangerous trends stemming from governance structures that are no longer fit for purpose.

We are at a crossroads. One road points to authoritarianism, while another opens up a more hopeful cosmopolitan future. The path to authoritarianism could be created by the search for decisive solutions

and ‘strong man’ leaders from people faced with a world that is seemingly out of control and where a retreat to the familiar (and away from the Other) offers a tempting way forward. Of course, we have been here before. The 1930s saw the rise of xenophobia and nationalism in the context of prolonged and protracted economic strife, the lingering impact of World War I, weak international institutions and a desperate search for scapegoats. The 2010s has notable parallels: the protracted fallout of the global financial crisis, ineffective regional and international institutions, and a growing xenophobic discourse that places virtually all blame for every problem on some form of Other.

Under these circumstances, identity and distributional struggles typically intensify; mutual gain gives way to zero-sum equations, and the social order risks fragmentation and sectional struggle. It is not a surprise, accordingly, that the rise of the far right is a sustained and troubling trend. From Nigel Farage and UKIP in the United Kingdom, to Le Pen and the National Front in France, to Golden Dawn in Greece, to Norbert Hofer in Austria, and to the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, this trend is manifest across Europe. The retreat to nationalism and militant identity politics is counter to the process of national accommodation that has underpinned European peace since the end of the Second World War. It is as if all that was learnt in the wake of the Second World War risks being undone. And yet, it would be false to assign all responsibility for the erosion of accommodation to right wing politics. Exclusionary politics can, and does, come from all sides of the political spectrum and has clear manifestations on the far-left in Britain, France and Germany to name a few.

But there are alternative routes. To begin with, we have the option of recalling where the pursuit of authoritarianism leads. The routes chosen in the 1930s all led to calamity and destruction, while the 1940s rediscovered the dangers of simply putting up the shutters, pursuing protectionism and denying the equal dignity of each and all. The architects of the post-war era, who put in place the human rights regime and a re-invigorated law of war, set down elements of a universal constitutional order in which two principles became the bedrock of peace and stability: the equal moral standing of each and every person, and the equal rights and duties of each and all.

Moreover, a cosmopolitan model of politics and regulation can be found in some of the most

important achievements of law and institution building in the twentieth century. These developments set down a conception of rightful authority tied to human rights and democratic values which can be entrenched in wide-ranging settings. In this perspective, political power is legitimate if and only if it is democratic and upholds human rights.

Interestingly, within this new framework, the link between territory, sovereignty and rightful authority is, in principle, broken, since rightful authority can be exercised in many spheres and at many levels, local, subnational, national and supranational. Accordingly, citizenship can be envisaged, as it is already in the European Union, as equal membership in the diverse, overlapping political communities which uphold common civic and political values and standards. Citizenship, thus conceived, is built not on an exclusive membership of a single community, but on a set of principles and legal arrangements which link people together in the diverse communities which significantly affect them. Accordingly, patriotism would be misunderstood if it meant, as it all too often has done, ‘my country right or wrong’. Rather, it comes to mean loyalty to the standards and values of rightful authority – to common civic and political principles, appropriately embedded.

Suitably developed, this conception of global politics envisages a multilayered and multilevel polity, from cities to global associations, bound by a common framework of law, a framework of law anchored in democratic principles and human rights. The state does not wither away in this conception; rather, it becomes one element in the protection and maintenance of political authority, democracy

and human rights in the dense web of global forces and processes that already shape our lives. Perhaps more importantly still, it points to a political order no longer exclusively anchored in *raison d'état* and hegemonic state projects but in principles of global cooperation and cosmopolitan association.

The years since 9/11 have cast a dark shadow over global politics in many respects. The wars and crises of this period have put at risk the wisdom and achievements of the architects of the post Second World War era: of the founders of the UN and EU, of those who established and advanced the human rights regime, of the many actors and agencies that have tried to mitigate climate change and other environmental threats, and of those who have struggled to address poverty and inequality across the world, among many other pressing issues. But while these wars and crises have put this all at risk, the achievements of the post-1945 era have not yet been undermined or damaged to the point of no return. The future is still in our hands. Our forebears created stepping stones to a universal constitutional order, and we can still walk across them and build on them further. This remains a future worth struggling for.

The other side of the cosmopolitan commitment to the equal moral worth of every human being, and to the equal freedom of each and all, is an acceptance of the plurality of ways of living and a tolerance of this diversity in all its richness, with one qualification – that pluralism does not undermine the boundaries of moral and political equality. With this understanding, we can consolidate a global order that serves the many, and not the few.

DAVID HELD

David Held is Master of University College, Durham and Professor of Politics and International Relations at Durham University. He is Director of the Institute of Global Policy, Durham University and Visiting Professor at LUISS University in Rome. He is the founder and Director of Polity Press, the Durham Global Policy Institute and the Wiley-Blackwell flagship journal, *Global Policy*. He is author of more than 60 written or edited books and of an extensive number of academic articles on democracy, democratization, globalization, global governance and global policy. Among his most recent publications are *Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation is Failing When We Need it Most* (2013), co-authored with Thomas Hale and Kevin Young, and *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities* (2010). His main research interests include the study of globalization, changing forms of democracy and the prospects of regional and global governance.

1.3. The current shape of global governance – a look inside the UN structure

Magnus Jiborn, Researcher, Lund School of Economics, Sweden
Folke Tersman, Chair Professor of Practical Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden

If our goal is to develop new models that will support better global coordination, what existing structures can we build on? The United Nations – the current hub of global governance – has had a number of at least partial successes over its seventy years of existence that we can learn from and improve upon.

The United Nations is the central hub of the existing system of global governance. It was established in 1945, in the aftermath of World War II, and currently has 193 member states.

The basic document defining the purpose and regulating membership, responsibilities, organizational structure and operations of the UN is the UN Charter. Echoing the famous first paragraph of the US Constitution, the Charter begins “We the peoples of the United Nations ...”.

However, this formulation also reveals a very important difference between the two documents: The UN is a union of “peoples”, not of “people”, and the UN Charter is a set of rules for voluntary cooperation between sovereign states, not a constitution. In line with this, Article 2 of the Charter stresses the principle of “sovereign equality” of all member states, and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of member states.

The purpose of the organization is stated in the first article of the Charter: to “maintain international peace and security”, “develop friendly relations among nations”, “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems” and to promote “respect for

human rights”. Other central goals for the organization today are sustainable development, international law and humanitarian aid.

The UN consists of six principal organs, with responsibilities, powers and procedural rules defined in the Charter:

- The General Assembly, which is the main decision making body with equal representation and voting powers for each member state.
- The Security Council, with five permanent members – China, France, Russia, the UK and the US – and ten non-permanent members that are elected for two year terms by the General Assembly.
- The Secretariat, led by a Secretary General that is appointed by the General Assembly on recommendation of the Security Council.
- The Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC, which is responsible for issues related to economic and social development as well as environmental issues.
- The International Court of Justice which is the main judicial organ of the UN, with the task of settling legal disputes among member states and

providing the General Assembly and the Security Council advisory opinions on legal questions.

- The Trusteeship Council. This organ was established in the original Charter, signed in June 1945, with the task of administering trust territories that lacked a sovereign government of their own, either by being placed under League of Nations mandate after World War I or as a result of World War II. The Trusteeship Council still formally exists, but has suspended all operations since 1994.

Apart from these principal organs, there is also a large number of subsidiary organs, programmes, committees, working groups and specialized

agencies. Some of these also have their own subsidiary organs. Thus the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, was established jointly by the UN Environmental Programme and the World Meteorological Organization, which is a specialized UN agency. In addition, some UN Conventions have their own separate secretariats, such as the secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC, which has a staff of 500 people.

The UN system is thus a large and complex network of interconnected organs and agencies with different mandates, memberships and principles of governance. The organizational map below only gives a rough overview.

FIGURE 1.1. THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM – ORGANIZATIONAL MAP

193 MEMBER STATES

THE CHARTER: “WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS ...”

Signed in June 1945 by 50 states. Defines the purpose, mandate and terms of operation of the principal UN organs.

PRINCIPAL ORGANS

<p>GENERAL ASSEMBLY Members: all 193 UN member states. Mandate: to discuss, initiate studies and issue non-binding recommendations regarding any matter within the scope of the UN Charter. Decisions are not binding on member states. Decision making: equal representation and voting power for all member states. Majority decisions, except certain important decisions that require two-thirds majority.</p>	<p>SECURITY COUNCIL Members: Five permanent member states and ten elected by the General Assembly for two year terms. Mandate: Responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Resolutions are binding on all UN member states. Decision making: nine votes, including each of the five permanent members, required for a resolution to pass.</p>	<p>SECRETARIAT Led by the Secretary General, elected by the General Assembly after recommendation from the Security Council. Responsible for the daily operations of the UN.</p>	<p>ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, ECOSOC Members: 54 member states elected for three year terms by the General Assembly. Mandate: to initiate or make studies, issue recommendations and prepare draft conventions for the General Assembly on issues related to economic and social development and environment. Decision making: Majority voting.</p>	<p>INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, ICJ Members: All member states of the UN are parties to the ICJ. Mandate: to settle legal disputes among member states and provide advisory opinions on legal questions to the General Assembly and the Security Council. All UN member states are obligated to comply with the court's rulings. Non-compliance can be referred to the Security Council for decision on possible enforcement (thus subject to veto power) Judges: fifteen judges, elected for nine-year terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council.</p>	<p>TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL Operations suspended since 1994.</p>
---	--	--	--	---	---

SUBSIDIARY ORGANS

<p>SUBSIDIARY ORGANS UNDER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: Membership: varying Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Human Rights Council The Disarmament Commission 	<p>SUBSIDIARY ORGANS UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL: Members: all fifteen member of Security Council Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Non-Proliferation Commission The Counter-Terrorism Committee The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 	<p>DEPARTMENTS OF THE SECRETARIAT: Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Department of Peace Keeping Missions Department of Political Affairs 	<p>UN PROGRAMMES: Established by the General Assembly, varying membership, funding and principles of governance. Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN Development Programme, UNDP UN Environmental Programme, UNEP World Food Programme, WFP, which were all established by the General Assembly but have their own principles of membership, governance and funding 	<p>SPECIALIZED AGENCIES: Autonomous organizations but connected to and coordinated in different ways within the UN system Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> World Health Organization, WHO International Labor Organization, ILO World Bank 	<p>RELATED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS: Some report to the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, others collaborate on an ad hoc basis Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> International Criminal Court, ICC International Atomic Energy Association, IAEA
--	---	---	--	---	--

The history of global governance is – so far – largely a history of shortage and inadequacy.

Not that there hasn't been brave ideas and ambitious proposals. Consider for example the various detailed drafts for a World Constitution and the political movement for transforming the United Nations into a World government in the decades following World War II – ambitions that had strong support among scientists, parliamentarians and members of Congress in Europe as well as America.

Nor is there a lack of international institutions devoted to global governance. Think of the UN system with its complicated web of more than 100 interlinked principal organs, secretariats, subsidiary organs and specialized agencies, employing more than 30 000 people all over the world.

Many of these institutions have no doubt made a real difference by offering solutions or partial solutions to specific global problems. The UN has delivered humanitarian aid to numerous crisis areas, saving millions of lives around the world. UN peace-keeping troops have protected civilians – but also failed to protect civilians – against atrocities in more than 50 armed conflicts, and sometimes been crucial for achieving and upholding lasting peace agreements.

Several international conventions addressing environmental issues – from the 1921 Convention Concerning the Use of White Lead in Painting to the 1989 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement – have contributed to at least reducing health hazards, environmental degradation and depletion of natural resources. In some cases, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC, they have not solved the issues, but set up conditions for seeking scientific and political consensus on how to solve them.

Still, when it comes to agreeing on and implementing effective solutions to some of the greatest and most pressing threats to humanity, the current system of global governance has proved sadly inadequate. More than 700 million people still live in extreme poverty, with 29 000 children under the age of five dying from preventable causes, every day. Global carbon emissions increase for every international climate mitigation summit that is held, and 15 000 nuclear weapons continue to threaten human existence on this earth.

To amend this obvious deficiency is the great challenge for our generation.

Perhaps some of the historical success stories – partial and insufficient as they are – can provide inspiration and knowledge for this endeavor? And perhaps an institution that was built to solve a problem in one area can be expanded to other problems as well, and thereby offer a realizable route to a successively stronger global governance system? That is how the European Union developed from a six country Coal and Steel Union designed to avoid war between Germany and France to today's increasingly integrated political union between 28 countries.

Among those partial global governance success stories, we should definitely include the Montreal Protocol, "perhaps the single most successful international agreement to date" according to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan¹. It came into force 1989 and has been ratified by 196 countries and the EU. The treaty requires all parties to reduce emissions of chemical substances that contribute to the depletion of the ozone layer.

The background was a growing awareness about the importance of the earth's ozone layer to protect from harmful UV-B radiation and the destructive effects on the concentration of ozone in the atmosphere from some chemicals used in, for example, spray bottles and refrigerators. In 1985 new alarming results about an expanding hole in the ozone layer over the Antarctica created increased political pressure for effective measures to deal with the issue.

Compliance with the treaty has been broad, with sharp cuts in emissions of ozone depleting substances to the atmosphere. Recent studies show that, as a result of the ban, the Antarctic ozone hole is starting to recover.²

Another partial success story is the institution of a permanent International Criminal Court, ICC, to investigate and try war crimes and crimes against humanity. There have been ad hoc courts set up for similar purposes before, beginning with the Nuremberg trials after World War II, and continuing with the UN international tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia in the 1990's.

The Court was established by the Rome Statute of 1998, following an international campaign led by a coalition of human rights organizations. 124 countries have signed the Rome Statute and are thereby under the Courts jurisdiction. It has so far tried 23 cases and issued 4 verdicts.

The Court is considered by some to be a historic milestone, ending the impunity of political and military leaders committing atrocities. But it has

some serious limitations, most obviously that important countries such as the US, Russia, China and India have not signed or not ratified the statute. NGO campaigns therefore continue in order to expand the jurisdiction of the Court.

An institution that can be cited as both an example of failure and as an example of partial success is the International Whaling Commission, established in 1949 to govern the commercial exploitation of the world's whale populations. Until the mid 1960s, the organization was dominated by whaling nations and its regulations focused on maximizing economic profits from whaling. During the 1960s, it became evident that whale populations were seriously threatened. Environmental organizations launched international campaigns for saving the whales and the IWC gradually changed its focus toward conservation and protection, and developed methods for monitoring populations and providing scientifically grounded policy advice³. In 1982 the IWC issued a moratorium on all commercial whaling, a moratorium that is still

in place although contested by some traditional whaling nations.

Interestingly, the IWC does not have the power to issue binding rules, and membership is voluntary. Some traditional whaling countries have at times chosen to leave the organization and resume whaling, but obviously the price in international shaming is expensive enough to motivate broad enough compliance for the moratorium to be at least partly effective.

Although data are often uncertain, and also contested, there seems to be evidence that the moratorium has allowed some of the species that were previously heavily exploited to slowly recover.

These examples are in no way conclusive. But they show that institutions can be created that allow for responsible governance of global resources and abolish impunity for the worst atrocities. They also provide experiences, good and bad, that the construction of better functioning future system of global governance could build on.

MAGNUS JIBORN

Magnus Jiborn is a philosopher and a journalist, currently doing research on climate policy and economic development at Lund School of Economics, Lund University. He is also founder and partner of Vetsam, a private institute devoted to science outreach. Magnus has a background in the peace movement, leading Sweden's largest – and the world's oldest – peace organization in the 1990s. He has previously worked with the founder of Global Challenges Foundation, Laszlo Szombatfalvy, in mapping the history of the idea of global governance.

FOLKE TERSMAN

Folke Tersman is Chair Professor of Practical Philosophy at Uppsala University. He is also the initiator of the Journal of Political Philosophy and has led the interdisciplinary research project Democracy Unbound. In 2009, Folke Tersman published the book *Tillsammans – en filosofisk debattbok om hur vi kan rädda vårt klimat* (Together – A Philosophical Debate Book on How We Can Save Our Climate). He recently returned to Sweden after spending a period of time as guest lecturer at the University of Sydney in Australia.

1.4. Global environmental goals: What works, what doesn't and why?

Maria Ivanova, Associate Professor of Global Governance and Director, Center for Governance and Sustainability, University of Massachusetts Boston, USA

What is the use of new global treaties if we don't know the precise effect of existing ones? To deliver better global policy results and improve institutional design, the Environmental Conventions Initiative proposes to measure, explain, and improve the level of implementation across global environmental conventions, based on empirical data.

Contemporary risks are increasingly global in scale, scope, and impact. Recent scholarship by a team of environmental scientists⁴ has pointed to the urgency of global action to reduce environmental risks as evidence mounts that humanity has crossed four of nine planetary boundaries, which delineate a “safe operating space for humanity”.⁵ This model acknowledges that humans have become the major driver of global environmental change and that, if unchecked, human activity threatens to cause irreversible environmental change. Two of the planetary boundaries – climate change and biosphere integrity – set core limits and crossing them would “drive the Earth System into a new state”.⁶

Global environmental conventions, also known as treaties or agreements, are the main international legal instrument for promoting collective action toward dealing with global environmental risks and staying within the safe planetary operating space. While it is estimated that there are approximately 1,100 multilateral environmental agreements⁷, just about a dozen of these treaties are truly global and

deal with global risks related to climate change, land-system change, biosphere change, and chemicals and waste. As we anticipate the entry into force of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement and prepare for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, it is logical to ask oneself: How have existing environmental treaties tackled the global risks they were created to address? What has made them successful or not? What has enabled countries to implement their international obligations and what have been the stumbling blocks?

Surprisingly, there have been no systematic empirical assessments of the degree to which countries have implemented their commitments under global environmental conventions. As a result, there is no baseline against which to assess performance, actions, or even expectations; and without empirical evidence, we risk erroneous conclusions. In the absence of implementation measurement, it is impossible to determine whether these conventions solve the problems they were created to address. Moreover, without understanding what enables or prevents countries from implementing their

obligations, no serious institutional reform can take place either at the national or international level. In essence, current scholarship is not able to determine whether the global organization charged with addressing global risks – the United Nations – possesses a reliable mechanism for planetary stewardship.

At the University of Massachusetts Boston, we have launched a research initiative to address this gap. The Environmental Conventions Initiative seeks to measure, explain, and improve the level of implementation across global environmental conventions.⁸ We use the national reports countries submit to the conventions to track and compare implementation results. At the heart of this endeavor is an index that illustrates trends across countries, within countries (across issues and over time), and across conventions. The index is a composite score derived from the answers to the questions in the national reports submitted to each convention secretariat.⁹

Aligning the data from these agreements is a particularly complex task as each convention has its own reporting platform, requirements, and timeline. Over the past three years, a team of researchers has coded over 90,000 data points dating back to 2001. The outcomes demonstrate the value of the exercise. Preliminary findings show that:

- performance has improved over time;

- many developing countries are more consistent with reporting and show higher performance than expected;
- many countries report consistently, even when the data show poor results;
- the complexity of the reporting process is not necessarily a deterrent to reporting compliance;
- institutional support from the secretariats is important in ensuring regular reporting and facilitating implementation.

The environmental conventions implementation index, as well as analytical country profiles and related training modules, will be valuable tools for accountability and transparency in national commitments and global policies. Empirical results are key to understanding the dynamics of implementation, engaging with policymakers, and identifying leverage points for improvement. Importantly, implementation of new global agreements, including the Paris Climate Agreement, the Minamata Convention on mercury, and the Sustainable Development Goals, will benefit from the lessons of this research. These lessons could inform policy dialogues about how to assess collective action, how to identify and overcome barriers to national reporting, and how best to use conventions to inform national policies and engagement.

MARIA IVANOVA

Maria Ivanova is an international relations and environmental policy scholar. She is associate professor of global governance at the John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies at the University of Massachusetts Boston where she also co-directs the Center for Governance and Sustainability. She is a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the U.N. Secretary-General, a board member of the U.N. University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability (UNU-IAS) and the Ecologic Institute in Berlin, and an Andrew Carnegie Fellow.

Part 2.

Emerging Trends

2.1. Governance for sustainable development – courts as the new game-changers

Malini Mehra, Chief Executive, GLOBE International, UK

As governments show signs of losing credibility for their capacity to tackle the world's greatest challenges, could the courts offer a new sense of hope for international governance? Recent cases at the national and international level signal a new role for the judiciary in protecting global public goods. At a time of great uncertainty, courts may be the new game-changers in reshaping our institutions.

What does ExxonMobil, the giant US fossil fuels corporation, have in common with Islamic terrorist Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi? On the face of it, little. Both however are the subject of judicial investigations with far-reaching implications for global governance and justice in the 21st century. In the recent case of ExxonMobil, the company is under investigation by state attorneys in New York and Massachusetts on suspicion of failing to disclose well-known risks of climate change to company shareholders. With the company's notoriety as a supporter of climate denialism already on the public record, any covert corporate attempt to thwart strict disclosure laws on non-financial risk for shareholders could prove highly damaging. Where environmental campaigners have failed to bring the multinational corporation to account for alleged environmental crimes, it may well be that the courts succeed.

The Al Mahdi case signals another breakthrough in judicial intervention on the global cultural commons, this time by the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Known principally for its focus on crimes against humanity, the 15-year old United Nations

court broke with convention in the Al Mahdi case to establish the willful destruction of cultural heritage as a war crime. Brought to the International Criminal Court at the behest of the governments of Mali and Niger, the case against the Ansar Dine terrorist Al Mahdi, who confessed to the destruction of UNESCO-protected religious and historic sites in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012, was keenly watched in light of cultural atrocities committed by Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The Court's judgment in August 2016 found Al Mahdi guilty of the crimes beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to nine years' imprisonment.

Shortly on the heels of this precedent-setting case, the International Criminal Court broke ground again in September 2016, this time by announcing that it would henceforth include factors such as the "destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources or the illegal dispossession of land" within its remit of criminal justice. This vastly broadened remit for pursuing claims against governments, companies or individuals by affected communities, on everything from reckless mining to land grabs, has huge implications, and a new frontier for justice seekers has opened.

There is little doubt that judgements such as the Al Mahdi case, or recent court actions on climate change such as the Dutch Urgenda and Pakistan's Leghari cases, all represent game-changers. They have established litigation through national and international courts as the new battleground for governance of the global commons and public goods. As one looks to the future, with governments losing trust and credibility with electorates, the roles of the legislature and judiciary – the other two pillars of constitutional governance – are coming back into focus as sites of democratic redress.

Environmental lawyers and judges, in particular, have not been slow off the mark. In April 2016, a

group of eminent international jurists established the Global Judicial Institute on the Environment in Brazil to promote the environmental rule of law and strengthen mechanisms for international legal redress on climate change, oceans and forests crises. Working with legislators through groups such as GLOBE International, their reach and impact can be profound and reshape public expectations of, and confidence in, democratic public institutions. At a time of great uncertainty and global challenge, confidence in a world governed by the rule of law in an independent and equitable manner is a precious, and renewable, resource.

MALINI MEHRA

Malini Mehra is Chief Executive of GLOBE International, the world's leading network of environmental legislators working across party lines to advance sustainable development. At GLOBE, Malini started a dialogue between legislators and the judiciary to improve understanding of their role in governance for sustainable development. This builds on her three decades of experience internationally in establishing institutions and innovating for sustainability in leadership roles within NGOs, governments, UN bodies and the private sector. She has served on UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan's Panel on UN-Civil Society Relations and was the architect of the UK Governments' pioneering Sustainable Development Dialogues with China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. Her present focus is on improving democratic governance for delivery of the UN Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

2.2. Privatization of Global Governance

Sachin Joshi, Director, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII-ITC) Centre of Excellence for Sustainable Development, India

Are we currently heading towards a privatization of global governance? Private entities have emerged as key solution providers for the world's greatest challenges, and exert control over technologies crucial to the future of humanity – in consequence, they now have a seat at the global negotiating table. Historical precedents encourage us to pay attention: this may well be the beginning of a new paradigm.

The engagement of non-state actors and more specifically for-profit entities in global governance is not a new practice, and has been the object of speculation and research for quite some time now. This phenomenon can be traced back to the pre-globalization era. However, since the globalization of trade and commerce has been promoted as a panacea for the prosperity of mankind in the 1970s, this phenomenon has visibly scaled up, and reached higher levels of formalization.

The private sector was brought on board for the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Millennium Development Goals, and various multilateral trade negotiations. Most recently a number of international agreements, including the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement, have seen the private sector even more extensively involved in discussions, and sitting at the table as a potential solution provider.

This marks a clear change from earlier periods, when the private sector tended to act as a lobby group, advocating on behalf of its own interests rather than the common good. In some cases, sections of the private sector have even built up activist-style pressures on heads of states to make progress on global agreements. Conventional activists and campaigners who frequently targeted the private sector are now finding themselves with strange bedfellows.

There might be genuine desire from the private sector to save the planet and humanity. However, this desire may also be triggered by the realization that sustainable

development is the biggest business opportunity of our times and could be a propeller for economic growth in an otherwise gloomy global economic environment. In addition, the call for politicians to agree on a climate deal or phase out HFCs provides direction and predictability in a business environment that has become hugely volatile and uncertain.

Three elements may help us make sense of this new phenomenon.

Recent events have led the private sector to realize that it needs to cure its own evils for the sake of its own sustainability. This was made clear in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy that led to recession in the US and the EU. This might also be true of practices within the pharmaceutical industry, where protecting intellectual property at the cost of much larger benefits to humankind may no longer be a viable option for the future.

For a long time, the private sector has been part of the problem. Involving private sector entities in decision-making on global governance issues may therefore be necessary to stop further damage and develop new standards for voluntary action, as well as new regulations. This was one of the main reasons why the Convention on Biological Diversity engaged actively with the private sector. However, it must be noted that some criticize this approach, arguing that the private sector will not endorse any form of regulation that might reduce economic growth and business profitability. Many scholars call for vigilance to ensure that the process

engages all key stakeholders and is not dominated by the private sector.

As global risks more evidently become potential business opportunities, the private sector is also becoming a potential source of solutions for the key challenges that the world faces. This change is supported by other actors. Legislators and policymakers have long given up on being solution providers, adopting the role of facilitator instead – whether they play this role without biases will be revealed in the future. Meanwhile, the third sector is looking to be more than a watchdog, and getting more comfortable helping the private sector improve its public image. In this new configuration, global risk reduction is no longer a zero-sum game for the various types of actors involved.

As the private sector reinvents itself, and its status shifts from “subject of regulation” to “catalyst of a future we want”, are we heading towards the privatisation of global governance? Perhaps the evolution of other governance systems could offer a point of reference.

States have been governed in various manners over history, by monarchs, by elected governments, or by dictators. Although changes from one form of governance to the other has not happened linearly, and for long periods of time, in various parts of the world, one or other system prevailed, we might see a pattern of successive evolution from one to the other. More importantly, a range of other sources of power have exerted influence.

A key point of comparison here could be the role of religious institutions. In many places, religious institutions have been a key player within established systems of governance. Their authority comes from the proclamation that they can act as a representative or avatar of God. Where religious institutions held a position of power, social rules regarding the best way to conduct one’s life were typically established in relation to the dominant religious framework, as articulated by these religious institutions. Often, religious institutions were a dominant social force, even when monarchs formally held power over the State. Over time, some of those monarchs became independent, whereas others acted largely under religion’s influence – in certain countries, such influence, or its consequences, is still visible today. In other cases, as monarchs gained partial independence from religion, they set up models that gave rise to secular state systems. Some of those monarchs still hold a measure of power within a constitutional system, while elected governments go about the daily business of governance. Although the level of progress towards such a constitutional arrangement varies from country to country, progress towards secularism seems to be a

desirable evolution for politics and governance alike.

There is no exact parallel between the evolution of governance in nation states and global governance – one of the main reasons being that nations typically do have a government while there is currently no global government. Nevertheless, history holds many lessons about power plays and the influence of different actors on human society.

In all likelihood, the importance of the private sector and its influence on human lives is only going to grow. Private sector control over public goods is likely to keep increasing: beyond utilities, private sector entities exert increasing control over intellectual and financial assets, especially as private sector entities develop new technologies, and gain ownership over them. The level of private sector control could increase particularly over artificial intelligence, human genome mapping, and a range of other technological developments that are key to the future provision of comfort for humanity, and may even become critical to the sustenance of human life. Such technologies also condition any possibility to develop inter-planetary human colonies. It is therefore hard to imagine the public sector and the third sector making progress on governance architectures, particularly those involving new technologies, without a substantial role for the private sector.

As the private sector moves from a backdoor presence to the center stage of global governance, its relationship with governments and global governance institutions is undergoing profound change. These relations are changing from a situation where parties won’t even acknowledge each other’s presence to one of growing mutual comfort – from dubious connection to unabashed partnership. This might well be the beginning of a privatization of global governance.

SACHIN JOSHI

Sachin Joshi is Director of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII-ITC) Centre of Excellence for Sustainable Development, where his work focuses on developing and supporting world-leading methods for sustainability labelling and CSR tracking. Previously, Sachin steered operations of the Centre for Social Markets (CSM) – a UK-based not-for-profit – and participated in the Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik’s (German Development Institute) Global Governance School. Sachin has authored a range of reports and articles on innovation, business models, CSR, climate change, and international relations.

2.3. Gender equality in global governance: not an optional extra

Anne Marie Goetz, Professor, Center for Global Affairs, School of Professional Studies, New York University, USA

How can we ensure that our global institutions do not disregard half of humanity? Current structures of global governance do not offer women a role equal to men in decision-making, nor do they show any clear signs of consistently supporting the challenges that women face around the world. Change will take more than simple gender parity in institutional staffing – we need global institutions that embrace a feminist agenda, and actively fight misogyny everywhere.

As the UN's ninth Secretary-General, Antonios Guterres, prepares to take up office on January 1, 2017, he is being flooded with advice on repurposing the UN to respond to 21st century challenges. Women's leadership and participation – and an institutional capacity to promote gender equality – has to be at the core of these proposals.

The rank sexism that triumphed in the 2016 US presidential election campaign, contributing to a global tide of belligerent nationalism, racism and xenophobia, rings a strident alarm to which multilateralism must respond. Misogyny cannot be ignored or framed as just a problem for unfortunate women in distant poor countries. It is a mobilizational tool linked to racism and isolationism of the kind that undermines multilateral cooperation. This is obvious from the fact that violent extremists make women's social and sexual subordination foundational to state building – to the point of bureaucratizing the sale of women as sex slaves¹⁰, as ISIS has done with Yazidi women.

Research has established that in countries where autonomous feminist organizations function freely, governments are able to combat violence against women¹¹, and are also more likely to find peaceful

solutions to internal and external disputes. Indeed, the level of violence against women in any country is a better predictor of national propensity to engage in armed conflict than is national wealth, the quality of democracy, the nature of the dominant religious system, or region.¹² Misogyny is not a side show. It is a driver of destructive decision-making. Combatting misogyny cannot be postponed until after peace, climate change or disarmament negotiations are over. As the anti-war activist Cynthia Enloe says: "later" is a patriarchal time-zone'.¹³ Postponement has been the fate of women's rights in multilateral institutions from the start, and it has to stop.

Gender parity in staffing is not the way this will be achieved. It is a common mistake to conflate gender balance with an institutional orientation to gender equality. Though gender parity is desirable for its own sake, it is sexist to assume that all women share – by virtue of their sex – a commitment to women's rights, or a capacity to promote equality.¹⁴ Gender balance in staffing and leadership has been justified on substantive grounds (women will bring gender equality perspectives), or on efficiency grounds (women reduce risk-taking behavior and improve the quality of decision-making), or on justice grounds (we should combat

the discrimination that prevents qualified women from being recruited). The reliability of the first two justifications is still in question, since there are still too few contexts with more than a token number of women in power to know what difference they make. But if combatting misogyny is an objective (and it must be) of multilateralism, then what multilateral institutions need, well beyond gender parity in staffing, are clear mandates to promote gender equality, well-resourced gender equality institutional engines positioned within the power core, and accountability systems that prevent failures to advance the gender equality mandate. These accountability systems must be monitored by women around the world, women fighting for gender equality. Without engagement from women on the ground, gender parity in staffing is an elitist project and gender-sensitive institutional architecture will not effectively address sexism.

Women's movements have historically put great faith in multilateralism, seeing international institutions as arenas in which to circumvent domestic patriarchies, securing international commitments to women's rights that would be inconceivable at home. But institutions such as the League of Nations and the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, as well as regional groups such as the OECD, the EU or the African Union, have historically treated gender equality as a marginal project, assigning a small underfunded institutional unit to women as a post-foundational afterthought. At the League of Nations, for instance, gender – or specifically, trafficking in women – was lumped in its Fifth Committee along with opium, refugees, relief after earthquakes, alcoholism, and the protection of children. The highly experienced foreign policy expert Helena Swanwick lamented, when she joined the 1924 UK delegation to the League, that she would be confined to that committee simply because she was a woman, calling it 'a rag-bag of miseries and forlorn hopes'.¹⁵ The UN made history in 2010 by merging its four tiny and competing gender units into an operational agency, UN Women, but this has been constrained from inception by inadequate funding.

2016 saw not only the dashing of hopes for the first woman president of the US – a country that ranks an unimpressive 99th in the world in terms of numbers of women in its legislature¹⁶ – but also the failure of the UN to appoint its first woman Secretary-General in spite of exceptionally well-qualified women constituting for the first time the majority of nominees for the post. Within the UN, 2015 and 2016 also saw revelations that the proportion of women amongst senior managers in the Secretariat had fallen from a 'high' of 24% in 2012 to less than 22% today, with fresh appointments to these positions in 2015 being 84% male.¹⁷ For feminists within the system, it is no surprise. The UN General Assembly pledged in 1990 to elevate the proportion of women in senior management to 25% by 1995. When that goal was not achieved, it resolved in 1996 to achieve a 50-50 gender balance in all posts by 2000. That date came and went without comment. The engine behind these demands had been the UN's global women's conferences of 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1995. 2015 was the expected date for the Fifth World Conference on women – but tentative efforts to get the ball rolling in 2012 were snuffed by fears¹⁸ that the darkening global environment for women's rights might roll back normative achievements.

The future of multilateralism must include not just a 'best intentions' commitment to gender parity in staffing and gender equality in objectives, but mandatory steps towards those goals. This is not an elitist project of finding jobs for the girls. It is about placing feminists in powerful positions, and making gender equality an institutional priority. This is why the campaigns to elect a woman Secretary General to the UN stressed that they wanted to see a feminist at the helm.¹⁹ The true test for male multilateral leaders who self-identify as feminist, such as Mr. Guterres, will be the extent to which they continue to insist on women's rights even when it is politically inexpedient, which it often is. Misogyny anywhere affects people everywhere. That is the definition of an issue needing a multilateral solution.

ANNE MARIE GOETZ

Anne Marie Goetz is a Clinical Professor at the Center for Global Affairs, School of Professional Studies, New York University. She was formerly Chief Advisor on Peace and Security at UN Women. She holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Cambridge, and is a regular commentator on women and international affairs.

2.4. China's role in global governance

Pang Zhongying, Professor, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, School of International Studies, Renmin University, China

How is global governance likely to change in the context of a rising China? Since the beginning of the 21st century, the country has deepened its involvement in existing structures while advocating for reforms and establishing its own position as a bridging actor. While there is hope that China may become a source of stability in a shifting, uncertain world, its long march towards a clear, established role in global governance has not yet ended.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has shown the greatest interest in global governance. In practice, China has increased its contribution both to the material provision of global public goods and to ideas and reflection on how best to provide them. China now exports its experience in economic development and in political/social governance to other countries in Asia, Africa and elsewhere – in particular, Africa has become a major destination for the “Chinese experience” in development.

The Chinese Communist Party now sees global governance as a top priority for China's foreign policy. However, China's role in global governance is complex.

First, China continues to deepen its relations with existing global institutions as part of existing global governance systems. After the lift of China's voting power in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, China's currency has joined the basket of currencies of the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). China has also become a leading contributor to the UN peace-keeping operations.

Second, China is no longer reluctant to acknowledge that it is a revisionist actor, and openly presents itself as a reformist player in the process of reforming existing global governance institutions – a process that China even presses to accelerate. One

approach consists in sponsoring new international institutions as a way to reform global governance institutions, an approach known in Chinese as “Dao Bi”. The Beijing-headquartered Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a prominent case of this “Dao Bi” approach. The World Bank and other international financial institutions have felt the challenge posed by the AIIB.

Third, China acts as a “middle” actor in global forums addressing global challenges. China's role in the G20 and the success of the Chinese G20 presidency in 2016 show that China is moving quickly to a central position in global governance. China enjoys a natural “middle”-ness, acting as a bridge between the “developed” world (the “Global North”) and the “developing” world (the “Global South”). China is a member of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, India and South Africa) grouping, which is a caucus similar to the G7 within the G20 – a hybrid but prime platform for managing the global economy.

What does China's role in global governance imply for others, particularly the West, and for the future of global governance? The US and Europe have long hoped that China could become a “responsible stakeholder” in a rules-based global system. Now, China is evolving towards becoming a major player in providing new solutions to global challenges. This may be one of the most positive developments in a time of increasing “global governance deficit”.

However, the world has to realize the limits of China's role in global governance. China's "long march" towards a modernized economy and democratized governance is still unfinished. The so-called "China model" and the "China experience" are not simply valuable, but also problematic. While China projects huge resources towards international engagement (for instance through the "Silk Road" initiative) and

even the development of its "soft power", China still relies on old global institutions for advice and support in transforming China's economy and society. While China takes the lead to become a rule-maker, it is still unknown whether China, the US and Europe will be able to act in concert for better global governance.

PANG ZHONGYING

Pang Zhongying is a Professor of International Relations and the Founding Director at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China. He is also a Distinguished Provincial Professor of Global Affairs at Zhejiang Normal University in Jinhua, China. His current research interests are comparative world order, global governance and China's foreign policy. Pang Zhongying served in both the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia. He was director of the Global Studies Institute at Nankai University in Tianjin, and founding dean of the School of International Studies, Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China.

2.5. Perspectives on the African single passport

Atangcho Nji Akonumbo, Associate Professor of Law, University of Yaoundé II/University of Bamenda, Cameroon

Could the recent institution of a single African passport, by stimulating trade and movement, effectively reduce poverty in the world's most fragmented continent? Although this initiative signals a positive trend towards greater integration, only concerted effort and investment towards education, infrastructure, and conflict reduction will support long-term unity, growth and prosperity for Africa.

Can the institutionalisation of a single African biometric passport effect integration and poverty reduction in Africa amid security and stability concerns?

In recent years, African leaders have seen the pressing need for Africa's development and have called for greater integration. This is now firmly rooted in Aspirations 2 and 7 of Agenda 2063 of the African Union (AU), respectively calling for an 'integrated' and a 'united' Africa. The recent adoption of the single African biometric passport, similar to Schengen in the European Union (EU), is a major step in this direction.

Under the 1991 Abuja Treaty, frameworks for African integration and economic development were established, with the division of the continent into sub regional (integration) blocs, or Regional Economic Communities (RECs), intended to serve as pillars of a united African economy, the African Economic Community (AEC). However, Africa is still considered the most fragmented region in the world. Infrastructural, security and stability constraints do not facilitate integration and trade, as compared with other regions, such as the Caribbean and South-East Asia. It has thus been rightly observed that Africa has integrated with the rest of the world faster

than with itself.

Economically, easing entry restrictions among African nations through a common passport would create a continent-wide market which could stimulate intra-African trade and investment, encourage entrepreneurship and business diversification. This would reduce the widespread dependence on goods from outside the continent and offer new business opportunities to many citizens, including jobs, as a result of greater employment mobility, thus helping to reduce the poverty cycle. Improved standards of living would in turn reduce brain drain and illegal migration from the continent by educated and skilled workers in search of greener pastures, as well as the tragedies which go with this. However, as in the case of the EU, some of the more developed economies within Africa would likely restrict entry of nationals from weaker economies in search of jobs, for fear of socioeconomic pressures.

Nonetheless, integration cannot be achieved by merely facilitating free movements through a single passport. Single passports have been introduced in RECs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa States (CEMAC), but proven not to be the litmus test for true integration, and even less so for poverty reduction.

According to the 2013 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 12 out of the 15 countries within ECOWAS experience some of the lowest socio-economic development indicators, including the lowest Human Development Index ratings in the world, and the situation in CEMAC is no better. The traditional problems of poverty, disease, malnutrition, unemployment and low living standards continue to exist in those Communities. Indeed, African integration should be considered as a development-oriented project incorporating regionalisation of citizenship through effective mobility and formal trade and investment, and include other standard socio-economic and political measures such as developing human capital and infrastructural, and a focus on peace and stability.

States have to adopt an integrated approach to develop a reliable workforce which will drive the desired economic growth and sustainable development – prerequisites for poverty reduction. Ease of movement under the single passport regime will support the distribution of human capital across the Continent, and might constitute a trigger towards its development. States should therefore invest in human capital via education and training as well as skills development. Increased spending in education, in itself, is a strategy to produce an intelligent, creative and reliable workforce. Enhanced mobility under the single passport would promote a more even distribution of technical expertise across states, and alleviate shortages in certain parts of the continent. However, concerns associated with the free movement of labour may arise, particularly in relation to the recognition of qualifications from different regions or unfamiliar educational systems. The establishment of national equivalence systems could be of great help here. The East African region has addressed this difficulty by encouraging mutual recognition of professional and academic qualifications in areas crucial for the continent's industrialisation, such as engineering and architecture. Interuniversity cooperation, facilitating cross-border mobility for students and lecturers, will also be helpful in better spreading training and trained labour.

The single passport would invariably trigger investment in infrastructure, since free movement of persons and goods cannot be achieved in the absence of robust and reliable transport infrastructure networks. Currently, Africa is poorly serviced with roads and railways, while air flights are still very expensive. A robust regional transport infrastructure

would contribute to the political, economic and social integration of the continent as well as enable the even distribution of human capital and the transportation of goods between important areas of production and consumption. The completion of the trans-African highway project, consisting of nine main corridors on a 59 100 kilometres stretch, can propel the achievement of this goal. The highway should be supplemented by railway networks and sub-regional networks. Also, African states should consider (re)launching a continental airline company, which would operate affordable intra-continental flights. Infrastructural strides must be complemented by the elimination of abusive tariff and customs/immigration barriers, police controls and other non-physical barriers. In fact, non-tariff and regulatory barriers cause unnecessary delays, raise transaction costs and prices, limit the movement of goods, services, people and capital across borders, and encourage corrupt practices, which are all inimical to sound integration and poverty reduction strategies.

Long-term peace, security and political stability among African states are vital tools of unrestricted mobility, integration, economic growth and poverty alleviation plans. Conversely, mobility and integration can propagate peace, security and stability by spreading the culture of tolerance and the virtues of good governance which underlie them (transparency, accountability, respect for human rights, primacy of the rule of law, etc). Yet, considering present conditions of insecurity and instability, particularly in the Sahel belt and central Africa, enhanced mobility could equally work the other way. In this context, mobility may facilitate the spillage of insecurity and instability into peaceful areas. In fact, some countries will legitimately resist free access into their territories, if that were to happen or could be anticipated. To safeguard greater security and stability, African states would have to resolutely work to prevent and end conflicts peacefully. They unavoidably need to invest in new technologies supporting effective traveller identification, such as tracking management systems and integrated border controls. Police and judicial cooperation between states should also be reinforced.

Obviously, the upshot of the single African passport is huge. Regional integration and economic development leading to poverty reduction could be achieved by increased mobility of persons, goods/services and capital. However, they involve long term processes,

which must be accompanied by both economic and non-economic factors including reforms, mobilisation of financial resources, institutions, implementation strategies and mechanisms, human capital and infrastructural development, security and stable

conditions as well as politically committed African leaders ready to share and achieve the common vision. Thus, the single passport is a precursor to integration and development, not a magic wand towards those ends.

ATANGCHO NJI AKONUMBO

Atangcho Nji Akonumbo is an Associate Professor of Law and Vice-Dean in Charge of Research and Cooperation at the University of Bamenda, Cameroon. He serves as an Official legal advisor to the Board of Custodians of the AfricaWide Movement for Children (AMC). His main fields of expertise are human rights law, corporate law and intellectual property. He is a lecturer and a professor of law in several universities in Cameroon, South Africa, and in the USA, and a very active expert providing legal advice and drafting laws in the areas of intellectual property and human rights issues since 1998 in several countries. He is consultant on child rights with a number of organizations such as AU and ACPF. He also serves as an Official Legal Advisor to the Board of Custodians of the AfricaWide Movement for Children (AMC).

2.6. From the regional to the global: better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart

Professor Ian Manners, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

What can the designers of new global governance models learn from the European experience? Over its seventy years of existence, the European Union has achieved peace, prosperity and progress in a continent that, for centuries, had hardly experienced ten years without a war. The core factor of this success lies in the fundamental goal of the EU: to better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart.

At the core of the European Union Treaty is the little-understood article 5 on the principle of subsidiarity, which can be paraphrased in this way: “the European Union acts to better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart”. Is there anything to be learned from taking this principle from the regional to the global? I argue that there is something to be learned about addressing global risks through global solutions from the way that the EU achieved peace, prosperity, and progress together, and that these results cannot be achieved apart.

Peace in Europe, and across the globe, is only guaranteed by addressing the roots of conflict. Prior to the process of European integration in the 1950s, going back centuries, it is almost impossible to find a decade of peace between current EU member states. Clearly, peace among European nations since 1950 has not been achieved by the EU alone – the presence of the USA, NATO, and the fear of the Soviet Union were all important factors. But NATO defends European members from external aggression, it does

not prevent conflict amongst European states, as the 1974-2004 conflict between NATO members Greece and Turkey over Cyprus illustrates. The military interests of the USA have swung towards East Asia, leaving Europeans to deal with Russia on their own. Most EU members have never been far from conflicts with their neighbours. The more recent conflicts in Yugoslavia and Ukraine illustrate that the past seven decades of peace in Europe can only be extended in the long term through EU member states acting together.

Prosperity in Europe has improved dramatically since the 1950s because of regional cooperation. The living standards of every EU member state have improved significantly since the 1950s, in particular those countries that started from a low standard in Southern and Eastern Europe. Rising living standards across the EU include substantial improvements in income per person, education, and life expectancy. It is possible that states could have improved their living standards without the EU, but the relative decline of non-member states such as

the UK from 1950 until membership in 1973 makes clear that this is probably not the case.

Social progress in Europe has been achieved through the spread of social freedoms and rights, changing our relationship with our environment, and supporting the spread of democracy. The social freedoms of people living in Europe have increased massively since the 1980s. These now include the freedom to travel, study, live and work in each other's countries without significant restriction. At the same time, social rights, particularly human rights and workers' rights, such as gender equality, LGBT rights, paid holiday leave, parental leave, equal pay,

fair treatment, and limits to the working week have all become law across Europe because of the EU. The EU has promoted the strongest environmental protection programmes and laws in the world, trying to lead the massive transformations needed to cope with climate change. The spread of democracy through EU membership is crucial for ensuring that countries are safer for people to travel, study, live and work within. But more importantly, the fact that democracies do not go to war with each other means that peace, prosperity, and progress in Europe and across the globe can only be guaranteed if the goal of our collaboration is to better achieve together what cannot be achieved apart.

IAN MANNERS

Ian Manners is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. Ian Manners works at the nexus of critical social theory and the study of the European Union in global politics. His current research interest looks at the EU and global governance at the intersections of global economy, society, environment, conflict and politics. Ian has uniquely contributed to all three major handbooks on EU studies, and his work received a number of academic prizes.

2.7. The 'Big Jump into the Jordan' – putting water before conflict

Gidon Bromberg, Israel co-director, Nader Khateeb, Palestine co-director
 Nader Khateeb, Co-director, EcoPeace Middle East, Palestine
 Munqeth Mehyar, Jordan co-director, EcoPeace Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Palestine

How could a river holy to half humanity turn into little more than a sewer? Cross-border conflict has led to the demise of the Jordan and caused severe loss of biodiversity. Yet hope exists: initiatives are building awareness among local communities and bring together the mayors of bordering cities for a symbolic act of collective belonging – jumping together into the Jordan. And as local leaders take steps towards increased collaboration, the river is showing the first signs of a rebirth.

We are at the Jordan River, just a few kilometers south of the Sea of Galilee. Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian mayors are getting ready to make a big splash – they are going to literally jump into the river together for an event called the 'Big Jump into the Jordan'.

If the event was being held along the Rhine or Mississippi rivers, in Europe or the US respectively, local mayors jumping into a river that they share would hardly make the news. In the Middle East though, the 'Big Jump into the Jordan' is covered by CNN and the BBC as well as many local media outlets. What is clearly unique here is the fact that despite their continuing political conflict, often with much loss of life, the participating Palestinians, Israelis and Jordanians have identified an issue of such high common concern that they are willing to take united action.

But why the fuss over the Jordan? Aren't the mayors at risk of being called traitors by their own communities for daring to make a common statement of concern?

If you cross the Jordan over the famous Allenby Bridge and blink, you will miss seeing a river at all. In a semi-arid area, water is scarce and communities need that water for drinking, farming and industry. Water diversion is therefore to be expected. But when

coupled with conflict, the result is total demise. In fact, since the 1960s, the River Jordan has become little more than an open sewer. 95% of its fresh waters have been diverted under Israeli, Syrian and Jordanian government policies. The river just south of the Sea of Galilee is the border between Israel and Jordan, and further south, between the West Bank and Jordan. The river is either fenced off, with mine fields along its banks, or surrounded by military check points preventing access from both west and east sides. As a border, the river is also a 'danger area', and thus became the backyard dumping ground for Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian sewage. Effluents have replaced the fresh water that once flowed, killing off an estimated 50% of the biodiversity that used to live in a once healthy, fast-flowing river.

So, what has empowered these mayors to take joint action when the facts on the ground are so bleak?

For over a decade, a program called 'Good Water Neighbors' has been running in the region. The program started in local schools, where youth, teachers and parents learned about the history of the river, considering both its human and natural heritage. One question was asked: how could a river Holy to half of humanity be turned into a sewage canal? Walking trails were developed, taking local residents to see the

demise, and asking them, where is my water coming from? Where does my sewage go? The trails get as close as they can to the border, so participants can look beyond the fence, and ask about the water situation on the other side.

Great efforts have also been invested in research. Respected professionals investigating the same questions as participants in the Good Water Neighbors program have produced reports that calculate environmental and economic loss from the demise of the river, and its impact on nearby communities. On this basis, an integrated master plan was prepared with European Union financial support. The plan estimates that a rehabilitated Jordan River and Valley could reverse not only the demise of the river but turn an area with much poverty – where pockets of up to 50% youth unemployment prevail – into a space of prosperity and shared wealth. There is one critical condition, however: cooperation.

The combination of 'bottom up' community education and 'top down' advocacy has created a constituency to support this vision. Though not a majority yet, there is now a vocal group of residents, municipal officials and mayors who see the cleaning up of the river and investment in the valley as their best hope for a better future. Understanding the river and its cross border meandering makes it obvious that cooperation is not about doing a favor to the other side, but a necessity, and a matter of self-interest. It is therefore no coincidence that the mayors of municipalities bordering the Jordan River have demonstrated leadership, while national governments have started to respond with some fresh water released back to the river and some of the sewage removed. Though much more needs to be done, the act of the mayors who, literally, got wet together, has come to symbolize hope in a region where not only water is scarce.

ECOPEACE MIDDLE EAST

EcoPeace Middle East is a tri-lateral peacemaking organization that brings together Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli environmentalists. Its primary objective is the promotion of cooperative efforts to protect a shared environmental heritage, while its ultimate goal is to both advance sustainable regional development and create the necessary conditions for lasting peace in the region. EcoPeace's three co-directors – Gidon Bromberg (Israel), Munqeth Mehyar (Jordan) and Nader Al-Khateeb (Palestine) – were honored by Time magazine as Environmental Heroes of 2008 and the organization has received a number of international awards, the Outstanding Leadership Award of the International Development Committee of the Association for Conflict Resolution, the Onassis Prize for the Protection of the Environment, and the prestigious Skoll Award.

2.8. Cities are key to our survival in the twenty first century

Robert Muggah, Research Director, Igarapé Institute, Brazil

Benjamin Barber, Distinguished Senior Fellow, Fordham School of Law Urban Consortium, USA

As nation states show signs of going rogue, could cities point the way to a more positive future? The Global Parliament of Mayors brings together representatives from around the world to work together on common priorities. In our increasingly complex global environment, such interconnected networks of cities could be the key forum to solve some of the world's most pressing challenges.

Cities are not just the dominant form of social organization in the 21st century, they are the antidote to many of the planet's most intractable challenges. We are, after all, an urban species. More than half the world's population already lives in a city, and cities generate four fifths of global GDP. There are a staggering 2,100 cities with populations of 250,000 people or more, including a growing number of mega-cities and sprawling conurbations with at least 10 million residents.

The widening clout of cities is not just a result of demography and economics. It is also fundamental about politics, including a revival of democratic governance at the urban scale. And many cities are thriving and driving positive change while states fall into gridlock and disarray. As this year's U.S. presidential race amply shows, even the world's most powerful nation states can become paralyzed by reactionary populism, polarization, and scandal.

There are ominous signs of nation states going rogue. Consider the cases of Austria, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland where angry right-wing populist administrations are threatening to take charge. In Russia and the Philippines, the current regimes can be characterized as strong-man autocracies. Against this grim backdrop, cities are a promising alternative for fostering effective and pragmatic

democratic governance from the ground up.

While some political leaders speak of throwing up walls, cities are busily getting connected with one another. In an interconnected globalized world, cities are the most interdependent of political entities. They are transactional, trade-oriented and open, and defined by physical, intellectual and digital bridges rather than borders. Bound together by dense exchanges of ideas, capital and people, and facing common challenges like climate change, migration, inequality and terrorism, city networks are the new normal.

But if they are really going to address some of the world's trickiest problems, city networks need to do more than exchange ideas and best practice. In order for glocal urban governance to thrive, cities will need to develop proactive partnerships across national and international frontiers. There are hundreds, even thousands, of fast-growing cities in Africa, Asia and the Americas that are literally and figuratively off the grid. Archetypal global cities like London, New York, Paris, and Tokyo are diverting our gaze from municipalities across the global south that are struggling to keep up.

Fast-expanding cities and shantytowns in the developing world are precisely where virtually all future population growth is taking place. Many of

them are struggling to attract and retain investment and talent, exhibit eye-watering rates of crime and violence, and suffer from extreme inequality and concentrated disadvantage. As successful cities rewrite the social contract to enable global collective action and agency, fragile cities watch helplessly as their social contracts unravel.

One way to help ensure that metropolises of all size and status benefit from the urban revolution is to build new modes of inter-city and cross-border collaboration. Some cities are already aggressively networking. Take the case of the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) that emerged after the First World War to facilitate the exchange of research and best practices. There are dozens of other city consortia including Metropolis and the C40 Climate Cities network which helped push for a climate agreement in Paris known as COP21.

Even so, there is still no legitimate and effective platform to foster collective city action to address the world's intractable problems. If mayors are going to cut carbon emissions or come up with smarter ways to deal with migration they will need to forge new ways of working together and co-designing solutions. Gathering data, sharing lessons and reaching out to global institutions is the first step. Just as important is lobbying international institutions, setting rules to identify common priorities and delivering services and good governance to citizens.

Critics will say that it's hard enough to achieve consensus with at least 193 nation states, so how will thousands of cities manage? Part of the answer

comes down to the intrinsically collaborative nature of cities. Nation states are independent, competitive and separated by territorial boundaries while cities are interdependent, cooperative and increasingly forging positive win-win partnerships. As Brexit and the populist movements in Europe show, nation states are starting to look parochial; an increasing number of cities are cosmopolitan and universal in their values.

What is urgently needed is a global governance body constructed purposefully for and by cities, a Global Parliament of Mayors. This is not a theoretical construct – it is already in motion. This past September, a group of more than 70 mayors and representatives from over two dozen inter-city networks gathered in The Hague to forge a compact. At the inaugural meeting cities as diverse as Buenos Aires, Cape Town, New Delhi and Paris addressed common priorities related to climate change, immigration, governance and public security.

The future international landscape is marked with volatility and uncertainty. There is a seismic re-ordering of international order underway that stretches from the U.S. and Europe to South and East Asia. There are no simple solutions and many potential flash points. But the truth is that the road to democracy, sustainability and stability runs not through nation states, but cities. Rather than standing still, city residents are already rolling-up their sleeves to get things done. Now is the time to empower mayors to take these efforts on a global scale.

ROBERT MUGGAH

Robert Muggah is a political scientist and development economist who focuses on security and development. He co-founded the Igarapé Institute where he oversees research and technology development in Latin America and Africa. He also oversees research at the SecDev Foundation, a cyber analytics group that focuses on Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has spent the past two decades working in conflict- and crime-affected settings, including as the research director of the Small Arms Survey (2000-2011) and advisor to the UN, World Bank and several governments. In addition to advising the Global Parliament of Mayors, Robert is a fellow at the University of Oxford, the University of San Diego, as well as the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. In 2013 he was named one of the to 100 most influential people working on violence. In 2014, 2014 and 2016 he gave talks at TED and Davos. He was also recently nominated by the UN Secretary General to support a global review of youth and violence. His books, articles and award-winning data visualizations have been featured by BBC, CNN, Financial Times, New York Times, Wired and hundreds of other outlets. He received his Doctorate at Oxford University.

BENJAMIN R. BARBER

Benjamin R. Barber is the first Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Fordham School of Law's Urban Consortium and the President and Founder of the Interdependence Movement. He also founded the Global Parliament of Mayors. Benjamin Barber's 18 books include the 2014 *If Mayors Ruled the World: Strong Democracy and Jihad vs. McWorld*. He is completing *Cool Cities: The Urban Fix for Warming World*, which will appear at the beginning of 2017. Barber's honors include a knighthood (Palme Académique/Chevalier) from the French Government (2001), the *Berlin Prize of the American Academy* in Berlin (2001) and the *John Dewey Award* (2003). He has also been awarded Guggenheim, Fulbright, and Social Science Research Fellowships, honorary doctorates from Grinnell College, Monmouth University and Connecticut College, and has held the chair of American Civilization at the *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales* in Paris. He received his MA and Doctorate from Harvard University.

2.9. BITNATION Pangea: the world's first virtual nation – a blockchain jurisdiction

Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof, Founder/CEO, BITNATION
James Fennell Tempelhof, Operations Manager, BITNATION

Could new technologies offer governance alternatives to the Westphalian Nation State? This is the model proposed by BITNATION Pangea, the world's first virtual nation, where contracts are negotiated and enforced through secure blockchain technology.

Our current governance model – the Westphalian Nation State – has created a geographical apartheid from which billions are unable to escape²⁰.

Since the development of technologies for accurate map making in the late 16th Century²¹, governance has been defined by the centralised, territorial and – arguably – coercive Nation State model. Born at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Governance 1.0 provides security and administers jurisdiction across defined territories. Over the following centuries, this model has spread from Europe over the rest of the world, and now encompasses the whole globe (apart from the uninhabitable continent of Antarctica). Residents of territories governed according to this model have no option but to accept the national interpretation of security and jurisdiction, whether or not it works in their interests. If your Nation State rejects your identity or lifestyle – if you are gay in Uganda or Muslim in Myanmar, for example – there are few ways to exit your geographical location and choose a governance service provider that meets your needs.

Yet in the 21st Century, for many people on the planet, these broad territorial distinctions have become much less important to both social and economic existence, and the territorial governance

model is increasingly irrelevant to the way many of us lead our lives. Through globalization, as more of our property and interactions become digital, various national systems of security and jurisdiction are beginning to merge. Our trajectories are becoming at once more local and more global, leaving the nation state behind: a beached whale stranded between tidelines. As maps created the technology for the development of Nation States, the rapid development of the Blockchain, and in particular Smart Contract technologies, is opening new horizons in the 'glocal' space. Smart contracts are computer protocols that facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract, or that make a contractual clause unnecessary. These technologies create the potential for peer-to-peer online governance modalities that will eventually out-compete the increasingly redundant Nation State.

Why is this the case? Right now, one way to think of political organization is that we consent to give our personal sovereignty to Nation States – and multilateral organizations such as the UN and EU – on the understanding that only their judicial, legal and law enforcement institutions can effectively protect our lives and property. But Nation States and Multilateral organizations cut a hard bargain in return for security

and jurisdiction, and, like any extortion racket, make unreasonable demands on our lives and property in return for protection. They may insist that we risk our lives in war, submit to the monitoring of our personal communications or give up large proportions of our earnings for services that we neither use or desire. Mass democracy, many argue, has made Nation States more accountable to people – and yet it is a very crude instrument, which (to paraphrase Socrates) is at worst mob rule and at best gives the majority a limited choice over which one-size-fits-all policies they are to be subjected to for the next four or five years.

So how can we build a governance model that reflects current social and economic reality? Imagine if we could make and enforce contracts without recourse to Nation State intermediaries who may use that power to limit our choices and place unreasonable demands on our time and resources? Thanks to the Blockchain technology, we have the chance to not only re-invent governance, but fundamentally replace the Nation State. This new model was first fully articulated by Tarkowski Tempelhof in the BITNATION Whitepaper of 2014, under the name Decentralized Borderless Voluntary Nation (DBVN).

So how would this work practically? Let's imagine an alternative governance universe in which we could solve a dispute about an asset through a smartphone chat – cutting out the high costs, time inefficiencies and potential coercion and arbitrariness of Nation State legal, judicial and law enforcement processes. What if a certain emoticon called upon a Blockchain Smart Contract functionality – including an escrow account embedded in the system, allowing a third party to hold title to the assets in question while the dispute is settled – made according to the code of

law and the arbitration method that we have chosen to settle the dispute. And what if all of that could be done in less than two minutes for minimal cost from the comfort of a mobile phone? This is the vision of BITNATION Pangea.

BITNATION Pangea will provide functionality in core areas required to provide an effective jurisdiction, so that it can outcompete those provided by Nation States:

- **Code of Law**
 - You can choose an existing code of law (e.g. Common Law, Sharia Law or the Civil Code), or upload a different code of law.
- **Arbitration**
 - You choose Arbitrator(s).
 - You can choose a crowd Jury.
- **Enforcement**
 - The system includes Multisig Escrow – a third party account – to hold mutual assets (money, tokenized land titles, car titles, etc).
 - A reputation system serves as an incentive for contract compliance.
 - Physical enforcement happens through private security.

This is why we believe that BITNATION Pangea – the world's first Blockchain Jurisdiction – will provide the core functionalities required to escape the redundant confines of Nation-State governance, and herald the dawn of a new renaissance – an era of discovery, opportunity and radical abundance for the territorially oppressed.

SUSANNE TARKOWSKI TEMPELHOF

Susanne Tarkowski Tempelhof is Founder and CEO of Bitnation. Bitnation is the world's first Cryptonation, a blockchain powered Governance 2.0 Operating System. Bitnation is designed to disrupt the nation state oligopoly through offering more convenient, secure and cost-efficient governance services. Susanne previously worked as a contractor doing research in various frontier and emerging markets on politics, culture, and governance.

JAMES FENNEL TEMPELHOF

James Fennell Tempelhof is Operations Manager of Bitnation, and leads the Bitnation refugee and security programs. He has a broad experience as a consultant and project manager providing innovative analysis and solutions to conflict and security issues, with a significant track records providing security advice and operational support in challenging environments across the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Central and Eastern Europe.

Part 3.

Looking to the future

3.1. Planetary stewardship in the Anthropocene

Johan Rockström, executive director, Stockholm Resilience Centre

As human impact on the planet's environment reaches unprecedented scale, what leverage points exist for transformative change in the way we collectively govern our world? Four directions deserve particular attention: support for new legal norms, changes in the UNEP mandate, supporting innovations with positive environmental impact, and securing popular endorsement.

The human enterprise's influence on the Earth system calls not only for an increased understanding of emerging global risks and transformation pathways, but also a serious reconsideration of the ways we, as a global community, govern ourselves.

Global governance and global institutions are of extreme importance at a time when decision-makers, business leaders, citizens and non-governmental organizations try to navigate a turbulent future. As the literature in the social sciences has shown, these actors are guided by a complex set of international norms and rules. What is worrying, however, is the fact that current models of global governance are clearly not up to the challenges created by the Anthropocene era – the current period of history defined by unprecedented influence of human action on the natural environment.

In a period of increasing interdependence and complexity, global governance remains fragmented, hampered by loud national interests, and unable to address global risks that present non-linear dynamics and repercussions. Current global governance models also systematically ignore the fundamental role that the biosphere plays for economic and human development in all parts of the world.

In this context, it is easy to focus on the severe

political and economic obstacles that hinder the emergence of models of global governance able to tackle the multiple social, political and environmental challenges posed by a connected planet under pressure. However, we also know that there are several potential leverage points for transformative change in the way we currently manage our global affairs. These include:

- the support of new legal norms that put “planetary boundaries” or a safe and just operating space for humanity at the center of international policy discussions
- an upgrade of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) into a strong international organization with a mandate to coordinate international rules in ways that support a transition to global sustainability
- a strong commitment by governments, private actors and the international community to experiment with, evaluate and upscale innovations that have a positive impact on the biosphere, or expand a safe and just operating space
- a recognition that transformative change requires engagement and mobilization “from below”, which requires that global initiatives for sustainability be endorsed by the population. Hence, beside being effective, reforms in governance need to be viewed

as legitimate by the general public. For this, they must meet three criteria: transparency, participation and accountability.

This list is by no means exhaustive, but as we face the prospect of a turbulent future, it provides important first steps towards a much needed transformation in the way we govern ourselves and our biosphere.

JOHAN ROCKSTRÖM

Johan Rockström is an internationally recognized scientist working on global sustainability issues, professor of environmental economics at Stockholm University and executive director of the Stockholm Resilience Centre. Johann Rockström is currently vice-chair of the science advisory board of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and a member of the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), as well as a member of several other committees and boards. He acts as an advisor to several governments, business networks and international meetings, including the United Nations General Assemblies, World Economic Forums, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conferences (UNFCCC, also known as COP).

Continuing the conversation

We hope the conversation will continue. You can help us by simply sharing this report with a friend or colleague. We're looking for partners around the world to join future publications, organise events, workshops and talks, or more generally support our engagement effort.

For more information, visit our website:
www.globalchallenges.org

ADDITIONAL CONTACT INFO

The Global Challenges Foundation:

Strandvägen 7A
114 56 Stockholm
Sweden

info@globalchallenges.org
+46 (0) 709 98 97 97

Endnotes

1. We The Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century. Millennium Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations 2000.
2. Eric Hand, "CFC bans pay off as Antarctic ozone layer starts to mend, Science 01 Jul 2016: Vol. 353, Issue 6294, pp. 16-17
3. Steinar Andresen, "International Whaling Commission", in *Essential Concepts of Global Environmental Governance*, by Jean-Frédéric Morin and Amandine Orsini (eds.), Routledge 2014.
4. Johan Rockström of the Stockholm Resilience Centre and Will Steffen of Australian National University have led a team of environmental scientists who, in 2009, proposed the framework of planetary boundaries.
5. The four boundaries include climate change, land-system change, loss of biosphere integrity, and altered biogeochemical cycles (Steffen et al. 2015).
6. Steffen et al. 2015.
7. Brown-Weiss & Jacobson, 1998; Mitchell, 2003, 2013.
8. In phase 1, we have analyzed the CITES-Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the CMS-Convention on Migratory Species, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and the World Heritage Convention. Phase 2 will include the CBD-Convention on Biological Diversity, the UNCCD-UN Convention to Combat Desertification, the UNFCCC-UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
9. Support for this project is provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York, through the Andrew Carnegie Fellows Program, by the Federal Office of the Environment of Switzerland, and by the University of Massachusetts Boston.
10. Rukmini Calimachi, 2015, 'ISIS enshrines a theology of rape', New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/world/middleeast/isis-enshrines-a-theology-of-rape.html>
11. Mala Htun and Laurel S. Weldon, 2014, 'Feminist mobilization and progressive Policy Change: Why governments take action to combat violence against women', in *Gender and Development*, Vol 21 (2).
12. Valerie Hudson Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose McDermott, Chad F. Emmett. 2009. "The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States". *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3. pp. 7-45.
13. Cynthia Enloe, 2004, *The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in the New Age of Empire*, University of California Press, page 215.
14. Pablo Castillo-Diaz, 2016, 'Hisland', *Open Democracy*, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/pablo-castillo-diaz/us-this-land-is-hisland>
15. Katherine Storr, 2009, *Excluded from the Record: Women, Refugees and Relief, 1914-1929*, Peter Lang, Berlin, page 170.
16. Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016, *Women in National Parliaments*, <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>
17. Karin Landgren, 2015, 'The Lost Agenda: gender Parity in Senior UN Appointments', *Global Peace Operations Review*, Center for International Cooperation, New York University, New York <http://peaceoperationsreview.org/commentary/the-lost-agenda-gender-parity-in-senior-un-appointments/>
18. Anne Marie Goetz and Joanne Sandler, 2015, 'Debating a 5th World Conference on Women: Defiance or Defeatism?', in *Open Democracy*, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/anne-marie-goetz-joanne-sandler/debating-5th-world-conference-on-women-defiance-or-defeatism>
19. 'Campaign to Elect a Woman UN Secretary-General', <http://www.womansg.org/>
20. 80% of the world's population live and work in frontier or transitional economies, 2 billion are unbanked and most are at least to some extent dependent upon the \$10 trillion informal 'system D' economy.
21. The Mercator projection was presented by the Flemish geographer and cartographer Gerardus Mercator in 1569. It became the standard map projection for nautical purposes because of its ability to represent lines of constant course.